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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEALY W. ADAMS, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee, 
Case No. 20040722-SC 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S BRIEF IMPROPERLY CITES TO MATTERS 
THAT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD 
On multiple occasions in its Appellee Brief, the State 
makes repeated references to matters that were stricken from 
the Record by the habeas court below. Such references are 
prejudicial, inflammatory, and highly improper, and 
Appellant Adams ("Adams") respectfully objects to the same. 
Specifically, Adams objects to the State's repeated 
references to the substantive contents of the affidavit he 
submitted in connection with his motion for reconsideration 
before the habeas court. Adams also objects to the State's 
improper reference to the death certificate of the purported 
victim, Carleen Hess. By order of the habeas court, these 
matters were stricken from the Record on August 7, 2004. 
(See Addendum A, attached to Appellant's Brief at 6, paras. 
3-4.) As such, it is entirely improper for the State to 
make any reference to these matters on appeal. Yet the 
State does so willfully and with impunity, on numerous 
occasions in its Brief. See, e.g. , Appellee Brief at 6, 51-
53 (improperly referring to the substantive contents of the 
Adams affidavit), and at 53 n.6 (improperly referring to the 
victim's death certificate). 
Even worse is the fact that the State has grossly 
misportrayed the substantive contents of Adams' affidavit. 
To correct this gross inaccuracy, Adams must now be 
permitted to make his own references to the contents of the 
affidavit; otherwise, his position will suffer great harm 
and prejudice on appeal. 
One particularly glaring misportrayal of the affidavit 
occurs at page 52 of the State's Brief, wherein the State 
asserts that Adams was told by attorney Earl Xaix that his 
claims for postconviction relief "lacked merit." (Appellee 
Brief at 52.) In making this assertion, the State has 
omitted an extremely critical fact: that attorney Xaix made 
this statement without the benefit of having reviewed Adams' 
file. (Record at 284.) The State has thus taken this quote 
out of context. Also, significantly, the State neglects to 
2 
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retainer, which tends to show that a less than thorough 
review of his claims had been made.1 (lea.) Again, these 
are critical facts, necessary to paint a more complete and 
accurate depiction of the contents of the affidavit. 
After ba :I3 \ r 111 i spoi: tra y :ii ng t:l le a f f d d a v :i t :i 1 :i :ii t:s brief, 
the State then infers that Adams'' lack of success d n 
locating counsel somehow "suggests that his claims *may 
simply be inherently weak,1 Anoel'lee Brief " '^--h/: ) 
Again, this inference is inaccurate, ana demands immediate 
cl a r i f i- • ; i n i ; r' • -,p- .. 1^  • 
the diligent efforts he made to attempt to locate counsel. 
For example, Hit aiiiaavit states that after having haa no 
success wxth ••^.'rrr' v- . \ .7 
State Bar for a -,.-1 ol attorneys capable of handdiri:; 
h a b e a s p e t i t :i • : :i (Re c o 1: d a 1 : 2 8 4 ) I: :i i : • = s p o 1 1 s e, Ad am s 
received - I i <=r ^f three attorneys to contact. He wrote to 
all three >j,.t heard oack from only one, who told h i m that he 
did not hand 1 e h a b e a s c a s e s ( I d ) T I: 3 e r e a f t e r
 r A d a in s \ / 1: : « ::> t e 
to several other state bar associations, again requesting a 
1
 As well, the state 1 las unfairly implied ti lat the claims 
that were discussed with attorney Xaix are the same claims 
asserted in Adams' petition for postconviction relief. 
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list of attorneys that could help him file a habeas 
petition. As a result of his efforts, Adams received the 
name of one attorney, but the letter he sent to that 
attorney was returned as undeliverable• (id. at 284-85-) 
Following this, Adams eventually was referred to his current 
legal counsel by other inmates at the prison. The foregoing 
in no wise suggests that Adams' claims are "inherently 
weak," as incorrectly implied by the State. Instead, a full 
review of Adams' affidavit shows that he made a diligent and 
concerted effort to retain counsel, and his lack of success 
in doing so was through no fault of his own. 
By making repeated references to matters that have been 
stricken from the Record, the State now stands before this 
Court with unclean hands.2 As a matter of fundamental 
fairness, Adams asks this Court to fashion an appropriate 
remedy. Toward that end, Adams asks this Court to: (1) read 
his affidavit in its entirety, and fully consider it for 
2
 There is no justification for the State's repeated 
references to these stricken matters. Certainly, Adams was 
careful to avoid any reference to them in his Appellant 
Brief. While Adams did raise a challenge to the habeas 
court's order striking his affidavit from the Record, he was 
careful to avoid any reference to the substantive contents 
of the affidavit. Further, he made no reference at all to 
the victim's death certificate. 
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purposes of this appeal; (2) strike the offending references 
in the State's Brief to the victim's death certificate; (3) 
admonish the State for improperly referring to stricken 
matters; and, (4) enter such further and additional relief 
as the Court deems just and appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case. 
II. PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE PCRA AND PROCEEDINGS 
UNDER HABEAS CORPUS ARE INTERCHANGEABLE 
A key issue that has emerged in this appeal is whether 
proceedings under habeas corpus are interchangeable with 
proceedings under the PCRA. The State's brief argues that 
they are not, asserting: "Proceedings under the PCRA are not 
habeas corpus proceedings under a different label." 
(Appellee Brief at 9.) In an attempt to support this 
argument, the State undertakes a fairly lengthy discussion 
of the history of habeas corpus law, drawing a distinction 
between the writ of habeas corpus and the writ of coram 
nobis. (Icl. at 9-13.) The State deduces that the PCRA is a 
descendant of the writ of coram nobis, not habeas corpus. 
(Id.) Ultimately, the State concludes that the PCRA's legal 
remedy is not directly analogous to habeas corpus relief. 
5 
(Id. at 14.) On this point, the State's position finds some 
support in dictum from a recent decision from the Utah Court 
of Appeals, Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196 
(2004). However, as more fully set forth below, the Manning 
case runs counter to controlling precedent in this 
jurisdiction. Despite the State's protests to the contrary, 
this Court has always treated habeas corpus proceedings as 
synonymous with proceedings under the PCRA. 
A. The Primary Function of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus Is to Provide Relief from Unlawful 
Confinement, which Is the Same Relief 
Afforded Under the PCRA 
It has been said that habeas corpus is Ma generic term,'7 
encompassing several different kinds of writs, the most 
important of which is the writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum. 39 Am Jur 2d § 1, at 200, The fundamental 
purpose of the writ is to deliver an individual from 
unlawful custody, including unlawful confinement resulting 
from the deprivation of a constitutional right- Id. at 200-
04. Historically, the writ has been considered the Marling 
of the English law," Rathbun v. Baumel, 191 N.W. 1233 (Iowa 
1922), and its scope and function have been deemed so 
6 
important as to warrant constitutional protection from 
legislative encroachment. U.S. Const. Art. I § 9 cl. 2; 
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (there is no higher 
duty than to maintain the writ of habeas corpus unimpaired). 
Utah law has long recognized the critical role the writ 
has served in protecting individual liberty. More than 50 
years agof this Court declared: "We must never lose sight 
... of the fact that habeas corpus is the precious safeguard 
of personal liberty." Thompson v. Harris, 144 P.2d 761, 766 
(Utah 1943). Several years later, in Hurst v. Cook, 777 
P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), this Court undertook a very elegant 
and flattering analysis of the function and scope of the 
writ. In Hurst, this Court emphatically declared: 
"Quintessentially, the Writ belongs to the judicial branch 
of government." 777 P.2d at 1033. The Court added: "While 
the essence of judicial power cannot be encapsulated in one 
writ, the writ of habeas corpus is one of the most important 
of all judicial tools for the protection of individual 
liberty." Id. at 1033-34. Against this backdrop, it is 
easy to see why the writ of habeas corpus has been 
designated "the Great Writ." State v. Perry, 758 P.2d 268, 
273 (Mont. 1988); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1376 
7 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Orme, J., concurring). 
To the extent the writ of habeas corpus may be used to 
collaterally attack a criminal conviction, "the purpose of 
the writ is now served in many jurisdictions by post-
conviction relief acts, which are deemed to be substitutes 
for habeas corpus." 39 Ana Jur 2d § 1, at 202 (emphasis 
added). By enacting the PCRA, Utah has followed this trend. 
However, notwithstanding the enactment of the PCRA, the Utah 
Supreme Court has consistently allowed inmates to challenge 
their convictions by way of petitions for writ of habeas 
corpus, treating such petitions as analogous to, and 
interchangeable with, petitions for postconviction relief. 
This point was made very clear in Hurst, wherein this Court 
stated: "Although a post-conviction relief remedy and the 
writ of habeas corpus have sometimes been thought to be 
separate procedures, the writ of habeas corpus has, over the 
years, absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a 
single constitutional remedy." 777 P.2d at 1033 (emphasis 
added). This is quite a definitive statement.3 
Only last year, this Court issued an opinion that 
strongly reinforces the notion that postconviction relief is 
3
 See also footnote 1 in Julian, 966 P.2d at 250. 
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synonymous with habeas corpus relief, Gardner v. Galetka, 
2004 UT 42, 94 P.3d 263 (2004). In Gardner, this Court 
quoted the following language from Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 
249, 253 (Utah 1998): "the legislature may not impose 
restrictions which limit the writ as a judicial rule of 
procedure, except as provided in the constitution." 
However, in place of the term "the writ", this Court instead 
interposed the term "post-conviction relief." Gardner, 2004 
UT 42, at 517. Notably, Gardner was a unanimous decision, 
adopted by each member of this Court as it is currently 
constituted. Based upon the foregoing, there is no question 
that this Court continues to adhere to the notion that post-
conviction relief is interchangeable with habeas corpus 
relief. 
B. Gardner Cannot Be Squared with Manning 
One month before this Court issued its decision in 
Gardner, the Utah Court of Appeals issued Manning v. State, 
2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196 (2004). Among other things, the 
Manning case is significant for attempting to draw a sharp 
distinction between relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which the court says is more properly 
9 
reserved for habeas corpus proceedings, and relief under 
Rule 65C, which applies to PCRA proceedings. The Manning 
court noted the "widespread confusion" that exists amongst 
litigants in seeking relief under these provisions. 2004 UT 
App 87 at 112, In a footnote, the court stated that while 
post-conviction relief may have had "its roots in the 
ancient writ of habeas corpus, it does not follow that the 
two may be used interchangeably, especially given the 
subsequent enactment of the PCRA." Id. at 120 n.5. 
Immediately prior to making this statement, the Manning 
court remarked: "Our decision today is not fundamentally 
inconsistent with Utah's pre-PCRA jurisprudence." Id. 
Actually, however, it is. 
Manning simply cannot be squared with Hurst, nor can it 
be squared with Gardner. Moreover, it cannot be squared 
with Julian, nor State v. Frausto, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998), 
Bennett v. Holden, 932 P.2d 598 (Utah 1997), nor Swart v. 
State, 976 P.2d 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Each of these 
cases involve successful appeals (save Gardner) by inmates 
of the dismissal of their petitions for postconviction 
relief, whether such petitions are styled as petitions for 
extraordinary relief (as in Julian), petitions for writ of 
10 
habeas corpus {as in Bennett and Frausto), or petitions for 
postconviction relief (as in Swart and Gardner). Further, 
each of these cases cite to, and rely heavily upon, habeas 
corpus law as the definitive, underlying basis for the 
decision reached therein. There is simply no fundamental 
difference between these cases. Manning, however, fails to 
reconcile them with its dictum that postconviction relief 
and habeas corpus relief are not interchangeable. Despite 
the Manning court's efforts to distinguish between habeas 
corpus proceedings and petitions for postconviction relief, 
the Utah Supreme Court has consistently treated these two 
procedures as synonymous, concluding that the two form "a 
single constitutional remedy." HurstF 111 P.2d at 1033. To 
the extent that Manning holds otherwise, it is simply not 
good law. 
III. THE PCRA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL NOT BY SUPPLANTING 
HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF, BUT BY IMPAIRING IT 
The PCRA significantly impairs the right of a person to 
petition for habeas corpus relief, as typified by the 
premature dismissal of Adams' petition on purely procedural 
grounds, i.e., the statute of limitations. Although the 
11 
State claims in its brief that the PCRA embodies a new legal 
remedy that simply supplants prior extraordinary remedies 
without infringing upon them (Appellee Brief at 17), such 
claim is untenable. 
Application of the PCRA is extremely broad, encompassing 
seemingly all petitions for postconviction relief- While 
the State claims that the PCRA "permits" any person who has 
been convicted of a criminal offense to file a petition 
under its provisions, the Act seems hardly permissive• 
Instead, on its face it appears to be mandatory in scope, 
leaving no room for convicted persons to separately petition 
for extraordinary relief when mounting a collateral attack 
on their convictions. S^ e UCA § 78-35a-102; Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C(a) ("This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions 
for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-101 et seq., Postconviction Remedies Act."). 
If the State is correct in its view that the PCRA is 
permissive in nature, then the lower court clearly erred in 
dismissing Adams' petition pursuant to the PCRAfs one-year 
statute of limitations. This is because Adams' petition 
sought not only postconviction relief under the PCRA, but 
also, in the alternative, extraordinary relief by way of 
12 
habeas corpus. The petition itself is styled, "Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (URCP 65B, C); Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus," Record at 1. Further, in its 
prayer for relief, the petition requests not only the 
holding of an evidentiary hearing to allow Adams to prove 
his claims, but also that the habeas court "issue an Order 
for Extraordinary Relief to have the Petitioner [Adams] 
brought before it, to the end that the illegal activity of 
the Respondents be terminated, and that the restraint upon 
Petitioner's liberty be removed." id. at 20-21. 
In pleading for habeas corpus relief, Adams' petition 
clearly satisfies the standard for pleading a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, sufficient to defeat a motion 
to dismiss. Insofar as his petition has adequately plead 
grounds sufficient to warrant the issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus—by pleading the occurrence of an obvious 
injustice, or the substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right, Hurstf 777 P.2d at 1034-35--his 
petition should not have been dismissed. The petition on 
its face meets the legal standard for relief by pleading the 
deprivation of a constitutional right, i.e., the deprivation 
of the right to receive effective assistance of counsel, 
13 
both at trial and on appeal. See Dunn v. Cook, 7 91 P.2d 
873, 878 (Utah 1990) (issue of ineffective assistance of 
counsel may be raised in a habeas proceeding). 
Consequently, Adams has adequately plead a valid claim for 
habeas corpus relief. Therefore, to the extent the PCRA is 
permissive, and allows litigants to continue to pursue 
extraordinary relief separate and apart from the Act, it was 
error for the lower court to dismiss Adams' petition based 
on the statute of limitations. Julian, 966 P.2d at 254 
(holding that XNiio statute of limitations may be 
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition."). 
In the alternative, to the extent that the PCRA is 
nonpermissive, but rather binding upon Adams and all other 
inmates seeking to collaterally attack their convictions, 
then it is constitutionally infirm. Effectively, the PCRA 
has operated to bar what the lower court found to be a 
nonfrivolous petition. Such result would not have occurred 
prior to the enactment of the PCRA, only after. But for the 
PCRA's one-year statute of limitation, Adams' petition would 
have been allowed to proceed. Consequently, the PCRA has 
clearly impaired Adams' right to seek redress by due process 
of law, in violation of the open court's provision of the 
14 
Utah Constitution (article I, section 11) and the separation 
of powers clause (article V, section 1)• This is the 
dilemma that confronts the State in this appeal. 
IV, ADAMS HAS ASSERTED A CLAIM OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE, 
WHICH CLAIM HAS BEEN PROCEDURALLY BARRED 
The State's brief at page 31 argues that the PCRA's 
statute of limitations would never bar a claim of "actual 
innocence/' The clear implication is that Adams7 petition 
involves something other than a claim of actual innocence. 
The State is wrong in both respects: first, the one-year 
limitation period contained in the PCRA does indeed bar 
actual innocence claims; and second, Adams has asserted a 
claim of actual innocence. 
The following hypothetical is illustrative of the PCRAf s 
bar on claims of actual innocence: 
Inmate A is convicted of a felony following 
trial by jury, based solely on the testimony of 
a single eyewitness, witness B, the purported 
victim. No other witnesses testify, including 
Inmate A, acting on the advice of counsel. 
However, Inmate A was actually out of state at 
the time of the crime, and is completely 
innocent. Prior to trial, he asked his counsel 
to investigate his claim of an alibi, but no 
investigation was done. Instead, defense 
counsel chose to focus his efforts on attacking 
the credibility of the eye witness, and on 
15 
challenging the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony in general. 
After being convicted, Inmate A discharges his 
trial counsel and retains new counsel, who 
files an appeal asserting that the evidence was 
insufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Like trial counsel, appellate counsel 
also neglects to investigate Inmate A's alibi 
defense. The appeal fails. 
After serving five years of a fifteen year 
sentence, Inmate A encounters Inmate C while in 
prison, and receives a sworn confession from 
Inmate C, the actual perpetrator of the crime. 
Shortly thereafter, Inmate A receives an 
affidavit from his accuser, recanting her 
testimony. However, the accuser dies one day 
later in an auto accident. 
Armed with this new evidence, but not being 
legally adept, Inmate A decides to do nothing, 
figuring the more time he serves behind bars 
the greater his claim for damages will be when 
the time comes to sue the State for wrongful 
imprisonment. For two years he sleeps on his 
rights. He makes no attempt to contact an 
attorney. Finally, after deciding he has 
served enough time behind bars for a crime he 
did not commit, he initiates a petition for 
postconviction relief. 
In this hypothetical, Inmate A's petition would be time-
barred by the PCRA. It is time-barred because Inmate A, 
despite being actually innocent, knew the evidentiary facts 
on which his petition was based, but waited too long under 
the PCRA to file a petition for relief. In this respect, 
Inmate Afs claims are not saved by the interests of justice 
16 
exception, because he simply waited too long to file after 
being apprised of the factual basis for his claims. But for 
the one-year limitation period contained in the PCRA, Inmate 
A would have otherwise been able to establish his innocence. 
Adams' case is no different. Like Inmate A, he has not 
filed a petition in an effort to "get off on a 
technicality," but rather to assert a claim of actual 
innocence. But for the one-year time limit set forth in the 
PCRA, his petition would not have been prematurely 
dismissed, and he would have been afforded an opportunity to 
show his innocence in court. In other words, he would have 
been afforded "a remedy by due course of law." Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Utah 1989). 
To flesh out this argument, it is important to outline 
the basis for Adams' claim of actual innocence. This claim 
is predicated in part on the ineffective assistance of his 
trial counsel in failing to assert a defense of voluntary 
intoxication.4 More likely than not, had trial counsel met 
minimum levels of competency by properly asserting such a 
defense, Adams would not have been convicted (especially if 
the other known errors that were committed at his trial are 
"Record at 11-15, 203-08. 
17 
remedied,5 and the scant evidence of his guilt is 
considered).6 Under these circumstances, it is 
unconscionable not to reexamine Adams' conviction, inasmuch 
as it is now impossible to entertain any real confidence 
that the correct outcome was reached at trial.7 Yet 
notwithstanding the foregoing, the lower court has 
procedurally barred Adams' claim. This procedural bar 
simply cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Although the State would have this Court believe that 
achieving finality of criminal convictions is of paramount 
importance, is not the purpose of our criminal justice 
system to incarcerate innocent persons. Where an error has 
occurred that results in a conviction, particularly one 
impacting the magnitude of a defendant's constitutional 
rights (e.g., the right to receive effective assistance of 
5
 See Appellant Brief at 14-16, para. c. 
6
 See Appellant Brief at 16 n.3. Judge Davis of the 
Utah Court of Appeals has expressed sharp criticism of the 
prosecution's evidence, concluding it was "hardly adequate 
to support a conviction." State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781, 
(1998) (Davis, J., dissenting). 
7
 See State v. Thomas, 743 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1987) 
(appellate court's confidence in the outcome of defendant's 
trial undermined where defense counsel failed to present a 
voluntary intoxication defense, deemed to be "crucial" to 
the fairness of the trial). 
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counsel, both at trial and on appeal), our system must allow 
such individuals to seek redress from their wrongful 
confinement. This is true no matter how much time has 
lapsed before redress is sought. As one authority on habeas 
corpus law has remarked: "Habeas corpus provides a remedy 
without limit of time for jurisdictional and constitutional 
errors occurring on the trial of a criminal case." 39 Am 
Jur 2d §157 at 348, citing U.S. v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469 
(1947), reh'd denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1947); Palmer v. Ashe, 
342 U.S. 134 (1951), opinion conformed to, 86 A.2d 61 (Pa. 
1952). Utah law adheres to this principle. In case after 
case, Utah appellate courts have consistently and repeatedly 
rejected the State's claim that finality of criminal 
convictions must prevail over fresh habeas proceedings. 
See, e.g.. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1034-35 ("As important as 
finality is, it does not have a higher value than 
constitutional guarantees of liberty."); Dunn v. Cook, 791 
P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1990); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 
1370-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Julian, 966 P.2d at 254; 
Fraustof 966 P.2d at 851; Swart v. State, 976 P.2d 100, 101 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) . 
In the case at bar, Adams has plead a nonfrivolous claim 
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for habeas corpus relief, but has been deprived the right to 
seek redress for the same. He has thus been deprived of a 
remedy by due course of law. The legislature's efforts to 
restrict access to habeas corpus relief by enacting the 
PCRAfs one-year statute of limitations, while no doubt 
motivated by good intentions, nevertheless trample on the 
open court's provision of the Utah Constitution, as well as 
the separation of powers clause. This Court should thus 
find the PCRAfs one-year limitation period unconstitutional, 
and reinstate Adams' petition forthwith. 
V. ADAMS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF THE EVIDENTIARY FACTS UNDERLYING HIS PETITION 
FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
Aside from the constitutional infirmities noted above, 
the PCRA suffers from at least one other major infirmity. 
That is, even with the inclusion of the interests of justice 
exception to help alleviate the harsh one-year limitation 
period, the PCRA still lacks the flexibility in allowing 
individuals who may know the evidentiary facts of their 
claims to pursue such claims in a timely fashion if they 
lack the legal skill and know-how to do so. Again, Adams' 
appeal presents a classic example of this problem. 
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In this case, Adams has asserted that both his trial 
counsel and his appellate counsel were ineffective in 
failing to advance a defense of voluntary intoxication. It 
is undisputed that during the material events in this case, 
Adams suffered from severe alcoholism. His problem was so 
acute that at times, he would pass out from drinking too 
much, after which he would have no memory of what had 
transpired. Record at 3, 11 11-12. Often, he drank to the 
point of being completely unable to comprehend who he was, 
where he was, and what he was doing. Id. Certainly, these 
facts were known to Adams when he went to trial, and when he 
filed his appeal* Yet the legal significance of these facts 
(i.e., they negate mens rea) was entirely unknown to him, 
not having had any background in law. 
This is important. Utah appellate courts have long 
recognized the severe legal constraints confronting inmates, 
compounded all the more with the urgency under the PCRA to 
navigate quickly through an unknown legal system by filing a 
highly technical and procedurally complex petition. As 
pointed out above, supra at 10, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has recently noted that "widespread confusion" exists with 
respect to determining the exact procedure for litigants to 
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follow in seeking postconviction relief. Manningf 2004 UT 
at 512. As difficult and confusing as it is for attorneys 
to decipher, it near impossible for inmates to figure out-
When was the last time an inmate succeeded in filing a pro 
se petition for postconviction relief? 
The instant case presents the perfect opportunity for 
this Court to provide much needed guidance to litigants and 
courts by clarifying the proper procedure and method to be 
followed in granting or denying postconviction relief. 
Among the many questions that have been brought to the 
surface in this appeal are the following: (1) are habeas 
corpus proceedings interchangeable with proceedings under 
the PCRA?/ (2) may an inmate seeking postconviction relief 
opt out of the PCRA and pursue a separate claim for common 
law habeas corpus relief?; (3) is the PCRA's one-year 
statute of limitations unconstitutional?; (4) may an inmate 
seeking postconviction relief who knows the factual 
underpinnings of his claims, but who does not know the legal 
significance of those facts, nevertheless still pursue a 
petition for relief after the expiration of the one-year 
statute of limitations?; (5) what is left of the Great Writ 
if it is supplanted by postconviction relief, the two no 
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longer forming a single constitutional remedy? An opinion 
from this Court answering the foregoing questions would be 
extremely helpful to practitioners in alleviating the 
widespread confusion that now exists with the PCRA. 
It is respectfully submitted that Adams' failure to 
comprehend the legal significance of the facts underlying 
his claims for relief should not pose a bar to his petition. 
Utah law is replete with opinions noting the disadvantages 
that inmates face in seeking legal redress in court, 
particularly with respect to seeking habeas corpus relief. 
The following quote from the Utah Court of Appeals is 
illustrative: "In weighing the interests of the litigants on 
either side of a habeas corpus action, we note that [an 
inmate] trying to ascertain his or her rights and to file 
all reasonably known claims in the initial petition must 
make these complex legal decisions with limited knowledge of 
the law, limited access to legal assistance and often no 
access to a law library." Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 
1370 (1993). Similar sentiments were echoed by this Court 
in a concurring opinion in Julian: "In Utah, most minimal 
legal research materials are lacking at the prison, and the 
legal services provided to assist the prisoners are grossly 
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inaccurate." 966 P.2d at 259 (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
In a recent case, Swart v. State, 976 P.2d 100, 101 
(1999), the court of appeals reinstated a tardy petition for 
postconviction relief where the defendant alleged he lacked 
the legal training to file the petition, and he was unaware 
of the PCRA's one-year limitation period- In the case at 
hand, Adamsf petition has asserted similar arguments. As 
such, there is no legal basis for treating his petition 
differently than the defendant's petition in Swart. The 
mere fact that he lacked the legal training and know-how to 
properly file a timely, properly supported petition should 
not bar him from obtaining a remedy by due course of law. 
This Court should therefore reverse the lower court's 
improvident dismissal of Adams' petition. 
VI. THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS STANDARD IS NOT THE 
APPLICABLE STANDARD IN UTAH 
The State's brief makes numerous references to federal 
habeas corpus law. Such references are inapposite. The 
standard for obtaining federal habeas corpus relief is 
intentionally more difficult to achieve than the standard 
applicable in most states. This is not to suggest that 
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Adams' petition would not qualify for federal habeas relief. 
Instead, it is only intended to correct any false impression 
that federal habeas law is relevant to this appeal. The 
State's citations to federal habeas law are unhelpful, 
because this Court has expressly refused to adopt the 
federal standard. As this Court remarked in Dunn v. Cook, 
791 P.2d 873, 878 (Utah 1990): x>[T]he state once again seeks 
to have this Court adopt the federal cause and prejudice 
standard[] to govern waiver on habeas. We expressly decline 
to do so. The circumstances of federal habeas are different 
from the circumstances of state habeas. In our view, it is 
appropriate that federal habeas review be more difficult to 
obtain than state habeas review." (Emphasis added.) 
Federal habeas law is simply not the applicable standard 
in Utah. Therefore, the State's numerous references to the 
federal standard in its brief should be given little or no 
weight. 
VII. ADAMS HAS SATISFIED THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 
EXCEPTION 
The State's brief devotes surprisingly little attention 
to the issue of whether Adams has satisfied the interests of 
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justice exception. The State argues that Adams' pleadings 
have failed to satisfy the exception. It protests in its 
brief that "[i]f interpreted too broadly, the interests of 
justice exception would defeat the purposes of the 
limitations period." (Appellee Brief at 38.) The State 
therefore argues in favor of a very narrow interpretation of 
the exception, applying it "only under truly exceptional 
circumstances." (id. at 36.) Unfortunately for the State, 
the interests of justice exception has always been given 
broad application. 
This Court's holding in Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249, 
254 (1998), is dispositive. The following quote is taken 
verbatim from the lead opinion in Julian: 
The State argues that the habeas court 
misinterpreted the purpose and meaning of the 
^interests of justice' exception, which should be 
read narrowly to apply only under truly exceptional 
circumstances. According to the State, the purpose 
of statutes of limitations is to encourage 
litigants to diligently seek out and file their 
claims early so as to promote finality and to 
protect defendants from having to defend stale 
claims. That policy, the State asserts, is equally 
important in post-conviction proceedings, in which 
the State has an interest in keeping persons 
convicted of serious crimes incarcerated. Thus, 
the State maintains that allowing attacks on 
legitimate convictions many years later makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the State to 
defend against those claims. 
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We fully appreciate the State's concerns. We 
emphasize, however, that when a court grants relief 
pursuant to a habeas corpus petition, it does so on 
the ground that the petitioner has been wrongfully 
incarcerated. That is to say, a court should grant 
relief if the petitioner establishes that he or she 
has been deprived of due process of law or that xit 
would be unconscionable not to re-examine the 
conviction.' Therefore, if the proper showing is 
made, the mere passage of time can never justify 
continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived 
of fundamental rights, regardless of how difficult 
it may be for the State to reprosecute that 
individual. 
We note that while Julian does not directly 
challenge the constitutionality of section 78-35a-
107 (the one-year statute), he argues that if the 
State's narrow construction regarding the 
^interests of justice' exception has any merit, 
then that statute [like section 78-12-25(3)3 also 
unconstitutionally limits habeas corpus actions. 
Under our reasoning in this case, proper 
consideration of meritorious claims raised in a 
habeas corpus petition will always be in the 
interests of justice. It necessarily follows that 
no statute of limitations may be constitutionally 
applied to bar a habeas petition. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Although the State in its brief tries to claim that 
Julian's "broad interpretation of the interests of justice 
exception would swallow the rule and render the one-year 
limit meaningless," (Appellee Brief at 38), the State is 
nevertheless bound to follow it, just like the habeas court. 
Inasmuch as Adams' pleadings before the habeas court 
properly satisfied the interests of justice exception, and 
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clearly they did, particularly when the Adams affidavit is 
considered,8 this Court should reverse the habeas court's 
ill-advised dismissal of Adams' petition, 
CONCLUSION: 
In this appeal, the State has advanced no new arguments 
to support the constitutionality of the PCRA. Instead, it 
has reverted to the same redundant arguments that have been 
previously rejected in case after case, to wit: that the 
principle of finality overrides individual liberty; that 
federal habeas law should be followed in Utah; that the 
interests of justice exception should be read narrowly; that 
the PCRA is not interchangeable with habeas corpus 
proceedings; and so on and so forth. Although the State's 
arguments have almost uniformly failed in the past, the 
State continues to present them, and even convinced the 
lower court to depart from the law and dismiss Adams' 
petition under the guise of the statute of limitations, 
despite this Court's clear mandate that no statute of 
8
 The habeas court strongly intimated that if the 
subject affidavit were to be considered, Adams would have 
satisfied the exception. See transcripts attached to 
Appellant Brief at Addendum E, p. 27, LL 6-14. 
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limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a 
properly supported petition for postconviction relief. 
Perhaps in large part due to the State's continual efforts 
to erode this Court's precedent, widespread confusion has 
now crept into the law, and it has become very difficult for 
practitioners to determine the proper method and procedure 
to follow in seeking postconviction relief. This Court 
should now once again enter the fray, and use the instant 
appeal as an opportunity to provide much needed guidance to 
litigants and courts. Adams requests that this Court now 
definitively reaffirm its prior holdings, and once again 
uphold the vitality and integrity of the Great Writ in the 
face of statutory attack. 
In the final analysis, Adams has properly plead a cause 
of action for habeas corpus/postconviction relief. To that 
extent, it was error for the lower court to procedurally bar 
his petition, preventing it from being heard on its merits. 
Adams requests that this Court now reverse the lower court, 
and reinstate his petition forthwith. 
DATED: / V W 1, WoC. U J ^ V\AsXS^AJ~<rr^--^ 
William P. Morrison 
Grant W.P. Morrison 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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